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The general purpose of this paper is presenting a systemic framework for assessing 
resilience in social-ecological systems based on the system dynamics approach, which 
is an especially useful methodology to model complex systems. In order to show how to 
assess  the  resilience  degree  of  a  system,  a  simple  system  dynamics  model  for  the 
collapse of Maya civilization, an extreme case of loss of sustainability, is built. The 
specific purpose of the model is twofold: a) to determine the minimal set of assumptions 
required to produce the loss of resilience that drove the late classic Maya civilization to 
collapse and b) to underpin a discussion of resilience and collapse in generic economic 
growth processes.  




O  objetivo  geral  do  artigo  é  apresentar  uma  metodologia  para  avaliar  o  grau  de 
resiliência de sistemas sócio-ecológicos baseada na abordagem de dinâmica de sistemas, 
a qual é especialmente útil para modelar sistemas complexos. Para mostrar como avaliar 
o grau de resiliência de um sistema, um modelo sistêmico dinâmico simples para o 
colapso de civilização Maia é construído. O objetivo específico do modelo é duplo: a) 
determinar o mínimo conjunto de pressuposições necessário para produzir a perda de 
resiliência e finalmente o colapso de civilização Maia e b) estabelecer os fundamentos 
sobre como utilizar o conceito de resiliência em estudos sobre crescimento econômico.  
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 1 – Introduction 
 
A vast body of  literature on the subject of efficient governance institutions for 
human communities using  common pools of natural resources has been accumulated in 
recent years (for a survey of this literature, see Ostrom, 2005, chap. 8). According with 
that  literature,  the  most  critical  aspects  of  the  problem  are  related  to  the  idea  of 
resilience, a concept not traditionally used in studies on economic growth. Such studies 
nevertheless,  for  reasons  that  will  become  clear  later  in  this  paper,  should  likely 
emphasize the conditions for resilience or sustainability
1 as well as the requirements for 
growth igniting.  Broadly speaking, the concept of resilience refers to the capacity of a 
social-ecological  system  –  that  is  systems  which  include  human  beings  and  their 
environment  -  in  preserving  its  functioning  in  the  presence  of  exogenous  change 
(Holling, 1973). The problem with this concept, as suggested for instance by Gunderson 
and Holling (2001), is that it is been hard  to find  simple  measures for resilience as far 
as  social-ecological  systems  are  complex  ones,  that  is  involve,  among  other 
characteristics,  the  properties  of  non-linearity  and  self-organization.  The  general 
purpose of this paper thus is presenting a systemic framework for assessing resilience in 
social-ecological  systems  based  on  the  system  dynamics  approach  which  is  an 
especially useful methodology to model systems presenting the properties above.   
Many works have considered the loss of resilience mostly as a consequence of 
surprise-driven crises that affect system´s agent’s ability to cope with sudden dramatic 
perturbations, such as in the case of unusually severe droughts (Weiss and Bradley, 
2001), or environmental disturbances resulting from resource mismanaging (Diamond 
2005). The problem with those studies is they do not develop explanatory arguments 
that link cause clearly to effect (Tainter, 2000: 342) Systemic analysis suggests that link  
can be  very  subtle  and  complex.  Bueno (2009)  and  Bueno  and  Basurto (2009),  for 
instance, have shown that the process of loss  of resilience  takes place when the system 
crosses a critical quantitative threshold – a tipping point - even for a small margin, 
which  means that  the  loss  of   resilience  might  be  unnoticeable to  the  stakeholders. 
Beyond the tipping point, social- ecological systems flip to a different state in which 
their  dynamics  are  dominated  by  positive  feedback  loops  which  makes  the  process 
cumulative. The dominance of such loops – labeled as death spirals – is therefore an 
identifiable  signature  for  the  loss  of  sustainability  of  a  particular  social  ecological 
system. 
In order to show how to assess the resilience degree of a system as the distance 
from its tipping point, we shall present a simple system dynamics model for the collapse 
of Maya civilization, an extreme case of loss of sustainability. The reason for choosing 
this apparently bizarre example (for an economic paper)  is that, as we shall argue later, 
it  can  shed  new  lights  over  growth  and  collapse  processes  when  approached  under 
system dynamics lens. Despite the huge advances in our knowledge of Maya society 
specialized literature has provided, it seems that we may expect little further progress 
from traditional approaches in the understanding of basic questions regarding why that 
marvelous civilization lost sustainability and eventually collapsed altogether between 
800 and 900 AD. The reason for this is that, at least beyond some point, mathematical 
modeling seems to be the safer way to clear explanations of logical flaws and to identify 
the  critical  assumptions  required  for  reaching  unambiguous  conclusions.  Hence,  the 
specific purpose of the system dynamics model to be presented in section 3 is twofold: 
a) to determine the minimal set of assumptions required to produce the loss of resilience 
                                                 
1 As the meaning of both concepts can be assumed for practical purposes as similar, those terms are used  
interchangeably henceforth. that drove the late classic Maya civilization to eventually collapse and b) to underpin a 
discussion of resilience and collapse of economic growth processes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the literature 
on the Maya collapse is reviewed and a plausible systemic explanation for the event 
based on that literature is sketched. In Section 3, a systemic dynamic model based in 
that explanation is built. Section 4 presents the main results, Section 5 discusses them 
and Section 6 concludes the paper, suggesting that the system dynamics methodology 
may be a useful tool for economists interested in studying economic growth.  
 
2 – The Maya Collapse: a  brief  literature review  
 
The  dominant  present  view  on  the  Maya  Collapse,  following  the  modern 
literature on the collapse of civilizations which prefer to explain those processes by the 
occurrence of extreme events (Tainter, 2006), is that it would have been driven by a 
unusual drought about 800 AD. Field evidence, however, does not always fit well that 
explanation; a number of Maya sites survived the worst years of drought while others 
collapsed  before  those  years.  Thus  it  would  seem  fair  to  think  that  when  we  have 
something so complex as Classic Maya society it’s going to take either a complex string 
of events to drive it to an end (apud Pringle, 2009), or a number of different models to 
explain different processes (Lucero,1999). Specifically, drought would have triggered a 
number of other processes, such as institutional failures, which would have brought 
Maya civilization to collapse. For example, drought might have increased deforestation 
which would have aggravated climate change according a positive feedback loop, as 
posed  for  instance  by  Jared  Diamond  in  its  famous  Collapse.  That  last  explanation 
however, at least implicitly, also assumes that it was necessary a unusual strong shock 
to lead Maya society to collapse which has been hard to verify in field studies for a 
number  of  important    Maya  sites.  We  shall  not  attempt  to  evaluate  the  merits  and 
problems of each one of those explanations, rather we shall attempt to demonstrate that 
great part of the mystery of the process comes from the fact that collapses occurred 
moved  by  an  essentially  simple  dynamics  of  which  we  can  gain  some  insight  by 
adopting a  systemic approach as below. 
In  the  words  of  one  of  the  most  important  Mayanists,  Michael  Coe  (1971), 
“Almost the only know factor about the downfall [of the Maya civilization]… is that it 
really happened. All the rest is pure conjecture”. But that was a provocative way to put 
the question; we indeed know a little bit more about the process today. What we know 
with certainty from the observable archeological record is: a) the Maya collapse meant a 
general  failure  of  elite-class  culture,  involving  mainly  the  abandonment  of 
administrative and residential structures, cessation of erection of monuments, cessation 
of the use of calendrical and writing system, and in consequence the disappear of the 
elite class; b) there was a  rapid depopulation of the countryside and the ceremonial 
centers, and c) the process occurred in a  relatively short period of time – from 50 to 100 
years between 800-900 AD. A plausible systemic interpretation for Maya collapse is as 
follows.   
  Maya economy was an essentially human-powdered one. That feature, on the 
one hand, explain the relatively low productivity it presented even its agriculture had 
been able to introduce a number of techniques such as terracing of hill slopes and array 
of  canals  and  drained  or  raised  fields.  On  the  other  hand,  the  logistic  difficulty  in 
carrying food in longer military campaigns, due to the lack of other sources of power as 
horses, explains why Maya society remained politically divided among small kingdoms 
constantly at war with each other.   When the population in the Pre-classic became sufficiently dense (between 400 
BC and 50 AD) the solution for food shortages become raid neighboring groups for 
filling  the deficits. The long term tendency of introducing the more efficient techniques 
above mentioned were not permanent solutions to food shortage crisis because they 
induced  ulterior  increasing  in  population.  War,  therefore,  remained  as  a  permanent 
option. But once a competitive system among the Maya kingdoms was established the 
best strategy for any Maya polity was deterrence. 
     Massive  labor  consuming  investment  as  the  impressive  monuments  built 
mainly in the late classic period was a very effective way to communicate the relative 
strength of political centers. The sculptural and painted art showing terrifying treatment 
of enemies are a clear signal that monument building could be understood in the same 
way as a form of signalizing to visiting emissaries of potentially competitive centers the 
capacity to retaliate eventual invasions. 
  But  the  spending  in  monuments  had  probably  the  function  of  attracting 
unattached  rural  population  as  well.  The  Maya  of  the  Classic  period  were  engaged 
therefore, as remarked by Tainter (1988:.173), “in a system of competitive relations in 
which advantage would accrue to those centers that were larger, that invested more in 
competitive display, and that could mobilize greater population.” 
  The  concentration  of  population  in  those  centers, however,  had  the  effect  of 
making worse the deficiencies of the Maya agriculture due to the degradation of the 
agricultural  landscape.  Yet  they  managed  to  implement  techniques  that  delayed  the 
decrease of productivity that degradation implied. In the Copán Valley, for instance, the 
population rose to a peak estimated at 27000 people at A.D 750-900. Archeological data 
show that the different types of habitats were occupied in a regular sequence. By the 
year A.D 650 people began to occupy the hills, using terracing agriculture, which was 
likely one of the prime means by which Maya tried to increase agricultural production. 
Terracing, besides, is a very effective way to check erosional processes and to promote 
soil buildup and limit nutrient losses by conserving inorganic particles and leafy matter 
that would normally be washed downslope by rains.  
            Insofar  as  population  increased,  therefore,  the  entire  system  became  more 
interdependent. The viability of raised fields, for instance, depended increasingly more 
on slopeland terracing for checking erosion once large parts of forests had been cleared. 
As  far  as  the  Mayan  agriculture  was  human-powered,  vast  amount  of  labor  were 
required  for  maintaining  the  system  and  any  factor  which  limited  the  labor  supply 
would have serious repercussion in its viability. Santley et al. (1986: 146) summarize 
this point as follows: 
 
  “ It is conceivable, then, that the Late Classic collapse was the direct result of 
farmers making economically short-term decision which were dysfunctional on a 
long-term  basis.  Reductions  in  the  area  of  slopeland  cultivation  would  have  
exposed large portions of the landscape to the effects of those very degradation 
process which terracing was designed to retard. One thing we know about terrace 
systems  is  that  they  require  continual  maintenance.  Lack  of  maintenance 
commonly results in breaches in the terrace wall, and once a break occurs, the 
erosion of soil from behind the embankment is rapid and assured. Often as well, 
the smallest terraces are located upslope, due to the increase in slope angle, and 
these typically are the first to be abandoned because more work is required per 
unit  of  cultivated  space  to  maintain  their  embankment  walls.  Inadequate 
maintenance  upslope  will  thus  undermine  the  viability  of  components  of  the 
terrace system downslope. The erosion of slopelands will greatly accelerate rates of sedimentation in bajos and lakes. Increased sedimentation clogs canals which 
drain  raised  fields,  ultimately  raising  the  water  table  as  well  as  reducing  the 
biological productivity of micro-flora used as mulch. These processes would have 
had the effect of decreasing the area devoted to raised field agriculture, as well as 
of limiting the productivity of those fields which were still under cultivation. The 
erosion of topsoil from slopelands would have  also impeded patterns of plant 
succession, thus impairing forest regrowth. Seral development generally occurs 
quite  rapidly  in  the  humid  tropics,  with  dense  woodland  (but  not  climax) 
vegetation  returning  within  twenty  years.  Succession  rates,  however,  may  be 
significantly  retarded  if  edaphic  conditions  are  greatly  altered  by  habitat 
destruction.  The  restriction  of  many  species  of  seral  and  climax  vegetation  to 
refuge  habitats on the  margins  of  cultivated  zones would  have  further slowed 
forest regrowth. It may consequently have take decades, if not longer, for normal 
patterns  of  seral  development  to  become  firmly  established.  Thus,  what  was 
formerly a productive agrarian landscape may have been quickly transformed into 
an  agricultural  wasteland,  so  to  speak,  once  sufficient  labor  was  no  longer 
available to dive the subsistence economy”.    
 
  It was exactly that reduction on the availability of labor what happened in the 
Late Classic. By the end of this period, the production of all foodstuff was strained. 
The staples which were grown were rich in calories but very poor in other nutrients. 
The  nutritional  problems  resulting  have  great  impact  on  the  structure  of  human 
populations.  At  the  site  of  Copán,  but  also  in  several  others  as  documented  by 
archeological  surveys,  there  happened  frequent  surges  of  severe  infectious  and 
nutritional diseases. There was, for instance, high frequency of several varieties of 
anemia and scurvy resulting of Vitamin C deficiency. Male stature, in consequence, 
decreased  between  the  Pre-classic  and  Classic  periods,  while  life  expectancy 
declined abruptly in the late Classic. The lower class population, as a whole, was 
unhealthy,  and  experienced  a  high  number  of  deaths  among  older  children  and 
adolescents. 
Growing rates of mortality and of mal-nourished individuals in the population 
decreased  the  availability  of  labor,  and  in  the  end  of  the  Late  Classic  the  Maya 
economy was severely strained by the lack of manpower necessary to maintain the 
structure of its agricultural system. 
    The  reduction  in  food  availability  in  all  Maya  kingdoms  made  necessary 
intensifying the deterrence strategy of monuments building, which aggravated the 
shortage of labor for agriculture, setting in action what we may label as a death 
spiral: the degradation of the terraces led to sharp losses of productivity in raised 
fields  and  to  the  intensification  in  monument  building,  which  reinforced  the 
degradation of terraces due the reduction of labor available. When the death spiral 
started to dominate the system dynamics the collapse was rapid and unavoidable. The 
diagram to be presented in Figure 1 below will illustrate the whole process. 
 
3 – The model 
 
3.1 – Methodology 
 
The fundamental ideas of this paper come broadly from the field of system dynamics 
that originated in the 1960s with the work of Jay Forrester and his colleagues at the 
Sloan  School  of Management  at the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. System dynamics allow the construction and analysis of mathematical models and simulation 
scenarios that identify critical feedbacks influencing systems (Sterman, 2000). System 
dynamics has been increasingly used in a wide variety of environmental and resource 
settings (Cavana and Ford, 2004) such as global environmental sustainability (Meadows 
et al. 2004), water resource planning in irrigation systems (Sengupta et al.  2001), and 
ecological modeling (Costanza et al., 2001; Costanza and Wainger, 1993). A detailed 
description of system dynamics methodology with special emphasis on social ecological 
systems is given in Ford (1999 ) and a very readable general explanation about how to 
apply it can be found in Saysel et al. (2002).  A earlier systemic dynamics  model for 
the Maya collapse, finally, is provided by Hosler et al. (1977). 
 
3.2 – The model 
 
  Figure  1  in  the  next  page  depicts  the  simplified  stock-flow  structure  of  the 
complete  systemic  dynamics  model  used  in  the  simulations  carried  out  in  the  next 
section
2. Population is a stock or level variable which accumulates the value of the rate 
variables births and deaths.  
The population dynamics is given by the following   equation: 
 
   
rate mortality Population deaths







. % .  
  Where we assume that females are 50% of the population and that the average 
number of children by woman is 2,5, that is  we assume the fecundity rate is 0,0625, 
considering  an average 40 years life span in Maya sites  (fecundity rate is given by 
2.5/40). 
  Mortality rate is modeled by using the effect  variable “effect of food availability 
on mortality”. The way to do that is building a table or lookup variable as follows: 
     





base mortality rate = 1/average life span 
effect of food availability on mortality= ([(0,3)-(1000,1)],(100,3),(300,1.5),(450,1),(1000,1)) 
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Figure 1: The dynamics of the collapse of Maya civilization 
 
The variable “Population”  inside the box is the only state variable in the system, while the others are either parameters, 
like the “maximum population in raising fields”, or auxiliary variables, like the “% of the population on war and 
monument building”. Positive signs indicate that the variables move in the same direction and negative signs,  in the 
inverse direction. Thus  “Population”  increases with “births” and decreases with “deaths”. The double arrows ended by 
a cloud delimit the boundaries  of the system, that is what is assumed as endogenous or exogenous to it. The  sign (+)  
inside the “death spiral” loop arrow  indicates the presence of a positive or self-reinforcing loop. Hence, increases 
(decreases) in  “Population” increase (decrease) births flow and thus the “Population” next period. The sign of the loop, 
that is whether it is of self-reinforcing of balancing type, is obtained by multiplying the signs of the relationships 
included in the loop. The basic dynamics of the system  is as follows. Environmental degradation brought about by 
population growth led to more frequent wars among Maya  kingdoms and to an intensification of monument building as
a  deterrence  strategy.  This  relationship  is  modeled    by  a  gradual  (exogenous)  increase  in    the  percentage  of  the 
population involved in wars and monument building from zero to 11% in the late classic period; that is the exact 
relationships between environmental degradation and propensity to war is out of the system’s boundaries. That implied 
a gradual reduction of the population involved in agriculture, at first  in the terraces where productivity was lower. The 
gradual abandonment of the terraces increased erosion on slopelands which clogged  irrigation canals, decreasing  the 
productivity  and  production  (when  the  population  began  to  decline)  in  the  raising  fields.  That  eventually  led  to 
shortages of food and consequently to increasing mortality rates. The positive feedback loop labeled as “the death 
spiral”, highlighted by thicker lines, closes with the reduction of the population which leads to further reductions in 
agricultural population.  
  Figure  2:  The  relationship  between  food  availability  and  the  mortality  rate 
multiplier 
         
      Input = food per capita availability, Output = mortality rate multiplier  
 
  That is, if for instance the availability of food (corn) is 450 kg/year/person, base 
mortality  rate  will  be  multiplied  by  1  and  by  2  if  the  availability  of  corn  is  300 
kg/year/person.  
  The  availability  of  food  depends  on  the  population  size,  the  parcel  of  that 
population allocated in the agriculture, and the productivity of farmers in more and less 
productive lands.  Farmers prefer producing in more productive lands, that is in raising 
fields, but there is a limited amount of those lands available. Once that limit is reached, 
extra  population  must  occupy  slopelands  and  produce  in  terraces.  The  part  of  the 
population working in terraces is giving by: 
 
  population in terraces = population in agriculture * (1- % of population in raising fields) 
   
%  of  population  in  raising  fields  =  IF  THEN  ELSE  (population  in 
agriculture<=maximum  population  in  raising  fields,  1,  maximum  population  in  raising 
fields/population in agriculture) 
 
    That is, if the population is lower or equal to the maximum population that 
raising fields can support, farmers will use only those more productive lands. All extra 
population will be allocated to terraces. 
  Population  on  war  and  monument  building  sector  diverts  population  from 
agricultural sector and hence can trigger a process of collapse insofar as the population 
loss in agriculture decreases production in terraces enhancing erosion processes. This 
variable is  exogenously given by the equation: 
 
  % of the population on war and monument building = RAMP( 0.0025, 700 , 780)  
 
  Which means that the part of the population involved in those sectors increases 
by 0,25% a year from 700 to 780 AD, starting in zero and reaching the maximum of  
20% of total population in the last year. 
   The effect of the decrease of population in the productivity in raising fields is 
modeled as: 
 
  productivity in raising fields =  effect of production in terraces on productivity in raising 
fields (population in terraces/population in agriculture)*(base productivity in raising fields) 
 
 
  and             the  effect  of  production  in  terraces  on  productivity  in  raising  fields,  by  the  
lookup function presented in Figure 3.: 
 
  Figure 3:  The effect of terrace production on the productivity in raising fields 
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The  basic  dynamics  of  the  model  is  as  follows.  Population  growth  leads  to 
increasing food production at a constant per capita rate. When terraces begin to be used, 
average  production  decreases  since  productivity  there  is  lower.  Per  capita  food 
availability then decreases, leading to increases in mortality rate and thus in the flow of 
deaths.  When the flow of deaths overcomes the flow of births, population starts to 
decline. If the process is unchecked by further mortality reduction, terraces will begin to 
be  abandoned.  As  terraces  are  abandoned,  erosion  will  take  place  decreasing 
productivity  in  raising  fields  and  per  capita  food  availability.  The  death  spiral  will 
dominate the system’s dynamics, leading the system to collapse, if the mortality rate 
reaches a threshold in which the flow of deaths becomes permanently larger than the 
flow of births. Systemic thinkers often use the metaphor of a bathtub to illustrate how a 
system can lose sustainability. If the drain flow (that is the flow of deaths) becomes 
larger than the  tap flow (the flow of births)  the bathtub  will necessarily be empty at 
some point . 
 
4- Results   
   
  Figure 4 depicts the standard run of the simulation model presented in Figure 1.  
  
The  three  main  assumptions  for  this  run  are:  a)  the  annual  mortality  rate 
increases of 2.8%  to 3.5% in the late classic period, following a lookup function as that 
shown  in  Figure  2;  the  occupation  of  slopelands  starting  in  500  AD  increases  the 
production of raising fields according the lookup function shown in Figure 3 and c) 
population involved in wars and monument building increases gradually  from zero to 
11% between 700 and 740 AD, reflecting the rise in conflicts  among Maya kingdoms 
in the period. The conclusion is that the simulation seems to reproduce rather well the 
historical record of the  collapse of the Maya civilization showing a sharp  decline right 
after 750 AD and the virtual extinction of population  by the first contact with Spanish 
conquerors. But it might be argued that this outcome would have been generated by a 
very particular choice of parameters. Thus it is worth to test the sensitivity of the above 
solution  to variations in the range of the assumptions on mortality rate, effect of terrace 
production  on  productivity  and  the  share  of  the  population  on  war  and  monument 
building. Figure 5 presents the mains results of this analysis.      
 















Figure 4: Maya Population Dynamics – Standard Run 
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Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis  
 
   
   
a) Low effect: max mortality rate = 0.0312; Medium effect:  max mortality rate = 0.0368; High effect: 
max mortality rate =0.0427; b) High effect: productivity in raising fields increase by 20% due to terracing 
; Medium Effect: productivity increase by 10% and No Effect:  productivity is held constant; c) Share of 
the population involved in wars and monument building varies from 10 to 15% of total population. 
 
  Assuming that is very likely that the share of  population involved in  wars and 
monument building has crossed the threshold of 11% (actually 10.25%, as we will see 
in next section), Maya society would have collapsed even though, terracing did not had  
any effect on the productivity in raising fields. That is, the main parameter to trigger the 
death spiral and hence to explain the collapse was the effect of food availability on 
mortality rate. 
 
5 - Discussion 
 
  Out of simulations we might intuitively notice that the population collapse takes 
place  because,  at  some  point,  the  flow  of  births  becomes  smaller  than  the  flow  of 
deaths. A catastrophe like a big drought could certainly lead an entire society like the 
Maya to extinction. Adults who die will reduce the population level and thus the stream 
of  future  births.  The  death  spiral  could  then  be  triggered  by  a  sufficiently  strong 
exogenous  shock directly on any one link in the loop, for instance by a increase in the 
share of the population involved in wars and monument building due only to the effect 
of social circumscription (Carneiro, 1970). In this case, the greater involvement of the 
population in those activities would reduce food production, increasing mortality and 
thus  reducing  the  future  flow  of  births,  which  eventually  would  reduce  the  total 
population engaged in agriculture and the future availability of food. But what exactly is 
a strong enough shock?   
In Figure 6 we might see that the difference between sustainability and collapse 
can be very subtle. If the share of the population involved in wars and construction of 
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   b) Effect of increasing productivity  by terracing on 
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(1) Population: low effect of food availability on mortality 
(2) Population :medium effect of food availability on mortality 
(3) Population :high effect of food availability on mortality monuments is at most 10%, society will be able to sustain  its population level. But just 
crossing  that  threshold,  say  if  10.25%  of  the population  becomes  involved  in  these 
activities, might be sufficient to lead the society to a trajectory of collapse. 
 
 
  Figure 6: Share of the population in war, sustainability and collapse 
 
 
 The  explanation  for  this  somewhat  counter-intuitive  outcome  is  that  if  the 
population in war (pw)  is at a  maximum of 10%, decrease in production and food 
availability would lead to increased mortality, which will reduce to some extent the 
population. But the very fact that the population falls would reduce more the future flow 
of  deaths than the flow of births, leading the population to a lower level, but not to 
collapse, as shown in the upper scenario of  Figure 7. If pw is above this level, however, 
reducing  the  availability  of  food  will  lead  the  flow  of  mortality  to  be  situated 
permanently above the flow of births as shown in the bottom scenario of Figure 7. By 
exceeding that level, the dynamics of the system would be driven by the death spiral 
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Resilience,  again,  may  be  seen  through  the  lens  of  the  bath  tube  dynamics 
metaphor. System is resilient while the birth flow is not lower than the death flow.  
People certainly can create institutions capable of preventing society to overshoot the 
carrying capacity of their environment, which, in the model, is the main factor to driven 
it to collapse. Yet, as the process of crossing system´s sustainability tipping point can be 
very subtle, people may  not be aware that they are in a suicidal route.  The experience 
that people have before crossing the tipping point on the contrary is likely to misguide 
them when the crisis arrive. After all, things went well before and apparently nothing 
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(1) births : population at war 10,25 
(2) deaths : population at war 10,25 
Figure  7: Births and deaths  in  two scenarios for  population in war 5 – Concluding remarks   
 
   Analyzing the growth experiences of a number of developing countries, Rodrik 
(2005) concludes that it seems easier to ignite than sustain growth. The main reason for 
this is that the latter requires a cumulative process of institution building to ensure that 
growth does not run out of fuel and that the economy remains resilient to shocks. The 
concept of resilience used by the author, though in a different context, is exactly the 
same discussed in this paper, namely the capacity of the economic system of not being 
trapped in collapse processes like the one we have labeled “the death spiral”.   
  In the present paper we have attempted to show that growth processes is always 
driven  by  reinforcing  positive  loops.  Maya  population  grew  while  environmental 
damage produced by increasing population was not strong enough to increase mortality 
rate beyond the fecundity rate. Mayas could have adopted institutional responses to 
increase productivity in agriculture hence checking increasing mortality rate and they 
indeed  did  that.  But  the  very  measures  that  worked  in  the  short  term  contribute  to 
aggravate the problem in the long term, leading their society to eventually overshoot the 
carrying capacity of the environment, which set the system to operate in the collapse 
mode of the reinforcing positive loop which, at first, leaded to population explosive 
growth and eventually to collapse. The problem in systemic terms is the same we find in 
all complex systems, that is they are capable to generate irrational social consequences 
in response to apparently rational human decisions. 
  Economic growth is one of such processes. To date, it is  well established in the 
literature that a resilient economic process is one in which growth-spurring strategies 
are complemented overtime with a cumulative process of institution building  capable 
of sustain a positive feedback loop of growth working in the right direction, that is in 
the opposite direction from the death spiral. In a classical paper, Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1993), suggested that it is plausible interpret the divergent growth trajectories of US 
and the Latin American former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in terms of positive 
reinforcing loops. The argument proceeds as follows. 
  The fundamental differences in factor endowments in the New World colonies, 
which  were  perpetuated  by  government  policies,  predisposed  them  toward  different 
long-term paths. Unlike Latin American colonies, where factor endowments led to an 
extreme  unequal  distribution  of  wealth,  human  capital,  and  political  power,  United 
Sates (and Canada) was characterized since the beginning by relatively equality in all 
these dimensions. Greater equality in circumstances stimulated growth in US through 
encouraging the evolution of extensive networks of markets. This provided impetus to 
self-sustaining processes, that is processes driven by positive feedback loops, whereby 
expanding markets induced, and in turn are induced by more effective use of resources, 
the realization of scale economies, higher rates of inventive activities and other forms of 
human  capital  accumulation.  This  virtuous  feedback  loop,  however,  required  a 
simultaneous  operation  of  a  coupled  institutional  positive  loop  in  which  the 
development of legal framework was conducive to private enterprise in both law and 
administration, which made the economic system more capable of sustain growth, that 
is made it more resilient.  The development of an equalitarian patent system in US 
unlike in Brazil, for instance, was the most favorable in the world to common people at 
the  time.  This  democratic  institutional  framework  fed  back  to  the  first  loop  insofar 
technological  innovations,  which  appeared  largely  as  a  cumulation    of  incremental 
improvements in agriculture and manufacturing which did not require  extraordinary 
technical  knowledge  to  discover  and  so  was  available  to  ordinary  people  to  make, allowed access to broad markets. The greater their access to those markets, finally,   the 
more productive and innovative individuals and enterprises were. 
  Traditional econometric tools are not particularly suited to deal with feedback 
loops or processes of circular causation. In his already classic paper on institutions and 
growth Daron Acemoglu et al (2001), for instance, have provided a very enlightening 
methodology for assessing the importance of  the institutional framework for growth. 
Based on the fact that there is a clear endogeneity involved in the relationship between 
economic growth and institutions favorable to growth, they build a instrument for the 
variable institutions quality and, using the method of MQO in two stages, reach the 
conclusion that the mortality rate faced by colonizers was the more important factor to 
explain de differences in the future growth trajectories. Mortality rate was used as an 
instrument  for  institutions,  because  colonizers  preferred  bringing  with  them  their 
families and institutions from the mother countries to low mortality regions. At first 
sight hence, countries’ fate would be already determined by their early history, but it 
would be too deterministic. In other paper (2005), they propose a much more elaborated 
model of institutional evolution in which economic institutions co-evolve with political 
institutions  according  a  difference  equation  system,  which  resembles  the  heuristic 
model proposed by Engerman and  Sokoloff presented above, and in some ways the 
model we are proposing in this paper. Not surprising, since a system dynamics model is 
only a little bit more than a difference equation system presented in a friendly way. That 
is  why  we  think  the  system  dynamics  approach  might  be  a  useful  tool  for 
complementing econometric and theoretical studies on economic growth.       
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Maximum % of population in war and monument building = 0,20  
Corn productivity in raising fields = 600 Kg per adult/year, amount  enough to feed a 
family of two adults and three children per year plus  0.2  metric tons/year of corn  
(Flannery,  1976).  Slopeland  productivity  was  assumed  as  50%  of  raising  fields 
productivity (Denevan and Turner, 1985; Diamond 2005) 
Average life span = 40 years 
Base mortality rate = 1/average life span = 0,025  
Fecundity rate =  2.5 children/woman or  0,0615 children/woman/year 
 